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1. Introduction 
In Europe, unionism and solidarity almost always pass as plus-words due to their posi-
tive connotations, roughly in the same manner as democracy, equality and freedom. 
Nevertheless, the backslide suffered by trade unions in Europe (and in most of the rest 
of the world) begs the issue of why many (and indeed an increasing number of) em-
ployees cannot or will not accept this understanding, resulting in declining union mem-
bership, both in absolute numbers and measured as union density, declining levels of 
union activities and of strikes (Ebbinghaus & Visser 2000, Scheuer 2006, Visser 1998, 
2003). Also, it is a striking paradox to re-read Dunlop’s classic work (1958) work in In-
dustrial Relations Systems, where he describes all the advantages connected to this 
kind of system in the U.S., considering the fate of this system and of U.S. unions in the 
decades after the publication of his book. 
Of course, one may assert that across the globe ‘forces of evil’ have weakened unions 
through aggressive anti-union conduct by companies (as in the U.S.) or by legislation 
weakening union strongholds (as in New Zealand or the U.K.). Or that the neo-conser-
vative or neo-liberal counteroffensives especially in the 1980s have persuaded em-
ployees (wrongly) that unionism is not in their interest. But such explanations – if for-
warded by union supporters – are ‘self-serving’, and thus they may tend to deflect at-
tempts to a more self-critical approach to the understanding of the forces at play. Can 
we not provide better explanations of the recess of unionism, explanations that might 
also point to the downsides of union ideology and activity earlier on, and thus assist in 
defining how unions may redefine their ideology and their roles? In order to do this, this 
paper will do the following:  
• first, it will examine some central theoretical aspects of union ideology and prac-
tice with a main emphasis on European unionism (a case in point due to the 
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obvious general backslide in unionism’s strongholds in combination with major 
variance in the fate of unionism in the individual European countries), and  
• second, it will point out some issues needing further clarification in cross-
national studies in order to enable the redefinition of the union’s role in the 21st 
century. 
 
2. Back to Basics: What Do Unions Do? 
A trade union is or has, fundamentally, three functions towards it membership (and po-
tential membership), and they may be game-theoretically be formulated as three types 
of games: 
1. Unions represent a particular kind of insurance for members, producing indi-
vidualized goods for members needing it, related to their employment relation-
ship. 
2. Many unions are also professional associations, where a specified set of quali-
fications in an occupational group (and a degree of control of entry into the pro-
fession, i.e. a strong link between education/training and occupation, in some 
cases even in terms of an actual monopoly) is translated into a clearly delimited 
bargaining strength towards the employers (if necessary by unilateral action). In 
general, unions represent sets of qualifications or sets of job competencies that 
are more or less monopolized. 
3. Unions are collective actors, producing collective goods via collective agree-
ments, strikes or political influencing, aiming to alter the balance of influence 
and welfare at work and in society more broadly to the advantage of the mem-
bership. 
 
2.1. Unions as insurance agencies 
This is the most basic of the union’s activities, one which clearly distinguishes unions 
from other interest organization based more on activism, namely their individual mem-
ber service concerning assistance vis-à-vis the employer. Some organizational re-
searchers even believe that the trade unions were founded as insurance associations 
(the working classes often became insured through the trade union in mutual unem-
ployment insurance funds, sick benefit associations, strike funds and burial clubs), in 
which the very insurance association for members only proved to be fundamental for 
the unions’ ability to hold on to their members in the early stages of organizing (cf. 
Hechter 1987: 111-24). This view of the kinds of services offered by trade unions is ab-
solutely central for understanding present unionization trends and role of unions at 
work. Of course, employees may hire a lawyer if they are subjected to unfair dismissal, 
pay discrimination or other perceived wrongdoing at work, but this is both expensive 
and risky, and going through the normal court system is often also a very slow proce-
dure. Therefore, people who join unions do it in many cases because they are aware 
that even if they feel absolutely secure today, they may be in trouble with their em-
ployer tomorrow. This is why so much of the everyday humdrum work in the local union 
consists in individual member servicing, at least in the countries with reasonably high 
union densities. It is crucial that the union can help individuals in trouble, since if it can-
not, then this is not only a problem in its relation to the particular member, but also in 
relation to the larger group of members who may hear about it (and the press will also 
willingly report any news of unions failing to service their members). Even within one 
particular country, there is undoubtedly substantial variance in the extent and the qual-
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ity of the individual services rendered by various unions, but it would appear to gener-
ally be the case that this aspect of unionism is an important explanatory factor concern-
ing the union’s ability to attract especially those sections of its potential membership 
that do not have an inherent and strong ideological commitment to the union’s political 
or ideological mission. Those particular sections today no doubt represent the larger 
share of the potential membership.  
Hypothetically, one might indeed state that should unions decide to terminate all indi-
vidual servicing of the membership and only to pursue its ideological or political goals 
and mission, no doubt the majority of the membership would resign when they found 
out. Conversely, should they terminate their lobbying and their pursing ideological 
goals, a much smaller section would probably resign (cf. Knoke 1988, 1990). One 
might conjecture that France be considered a case in point of the former hypothetical 
situation: union density in France (at just about 10 per cent) is about the same level as 
the number of unionists in Denmark or Sweden who are active union members, i.e. 
who have been elected to the board of local club, who are shop stewards or security 
reps (these groups make up roughly 12-15 per cent out of the membership with a den-
sity of about 80 per cent). 
This might appear as an argument for pursuing pure ‘business unionism’ (cf. Perlman 
1928), but as Hyman (2001: 3-4) has pointed out, the results from unions pursuing pure 
business unionism strategies (e.g. in the U.S.) have been less than convincing. 
 Pure business unionism has rarely, if ever existed; even if primary attention is 
devoted to the labour market, unions cannot altogether neglect the overall so-
cial and political context of market relations. (Hyman 2001: 4). 
Pure business unions do exist, though, but their successes have certainly been quite 
limited.  
The point here, however, is a different one: if unions focus too much on their roles as 
parties to collective bargaining and as political influencers (lobbyists, as it has become 
more common to say in Europe, following the growing importance of the EU decision 
making process in Europe), or if they take too much to the streets, they may fall prey to 
ignoring or perhaps just giving too low priority to the individual services side of the 
membership relationship to the union. It would appear to this author that these individ-
ual servicing aspects are crucial in understanding the unions’ debacle, but also in for-
mulating ways to rejuvenate the relationship between the unions and its present dis-
contents. 
But why cannot this rejuvenation become based on a pure business unionism strategy? 
The reason probably is that the individual services of unions are based on the unions’ 
ability to either mobilize members or (more commonly) to appeal to the framework of 
rules and regulations that the employment relationship is embedded in. These rules 
may partly be national (or international) law, but in most cases this is supplemented by 
the rules laid down in collective bargaining agreements, to which unions are of course 
parties. These agreements require collective action in order to exist and they must be 
constantly renewed in order to be an ‘active good’ for the membership. Without these 
agreements, trade union individual services will do little more than may be done by a 
law firm, and in this competition the union may certainly be at a disadvantage: unions 
are not necessarily best equipped to compete in a market-for-services and may be los-
ing their ‘primacy’ in the access to certain types of service provision (Crouch 2003). In 
Denmark, aggressive competitors do challenge the unions’ traditional fields in this re-
spect, some more successfully than others, but altogether not growing in ways that 
threaten the present structure of collective bargaining. 
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Thus, the nature of collective bargaining agreements and of the rules-of-the-game in 
the labour market more generally are important determinants of the degree to which 
unions can successfully pursue an individual service or insurance strategy. I shall re-
turn to this below. 
 
2.2. Unions as expressions of professionalism 
If collectivism or solidarity were always connected to unionism in the literature, profes-
sionalism had a more ambiguous role. This is due to the fact that in traditional socio-
logical theory, professionalism was connected with the ‘high professions’, doctors, law-
yers etc., and not with craft unionism, although craft unionism certainly has at least 
some of the same traits. The ambiguity towards the concept is also founded in its ex-
clusivist nature, but it does not require much probing into the origins of the labour 
movement to realize that the first unions were craft unions and that their purposes were 
directed towards the unilateral regulation of the supply of employment in combination 
with the exclusion of the unskilled.  
Of course, industrial unionism erased many of the distinctions thus created, but indus-
trial unionism did not prevail everywhere, and even where it prevailed, some profes-
sion-based groups still manage to survive as trade unions or (softer-speaking) associa-
tions. Some industrial unions also have sections for particular craft or educational 
groups. The point of this is that unions that represent clearly demarcated educational 
groups or crafts and who spend their efforts to safeguard the quality of the education in 
question and to translate educational privileges into economic ones, have a much eas-
ier time recruiting a substantial share of their potential membership. This is because 
the collective action problem is minimized substantially when the potential membership 
is so much smaller, clearly defined and when it has economic interests that can be 
clearly separated from those of employees in general. Common socialization in particu-
lar educational institutions also helps. 
One may argue against this that the importance craft unionism may become much 
smaller in the second half of the 20th century, but one must remember, that the general 
level of education in all populations is growing, and that novel professional groups take 
the place of old ones: IT specialists and micro-electronics engineers may not feel the 
need for unionism very strongly, but times may change for them, too, and the need for 
a professional association defending educational privileges could very well be more 
clearly felt even by such groups. 
 
2.3. Unions as collective actors 
This is the most well-known and debated function of unionism, and it is certainly also 
the most visible one to the public eye. It is, however, vulnerable, due to two things:  
First, the collective action problem (Crouch 1982, Elster 1989, Hechter 1987, Olson 
1965, 1982), which makes it non-rational for the individual to join the union, since any 
goods produced by the union (a pay rise, say, or a shorter working week) will be likely 
to be shared by all, unionized as well as non-unionized. One solution to this problem 
has been the closed shop, but today in Europe the closed shop it outlawed virtually 
everywhere, due to a number of verdicts in the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights (one of the last countries to outlaw closed shop 
agreements was Denmark, cf. Scheuer 2007: 243).  
Second, the notion of collective ‘goods’ may also appear as too self-serving, since cer-
tainly not all employees may share the values and agree with the mission of a particu-
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lar union. Especially when unions are closely tied to a particular political party, and in 
consonance with this party over its policies, a substantial share of the potential mem-
bership may consider these policies as collective ‘bads’  instead and thus retract from 
membership. 
In the industrial (and labour) relations and perhaps especially in the political science 
literature on unionism and the role of unions, there is often a tendency towards a highly 
aggregated view of unions, perhaps unavoidable especially in the comparative writing. 
Thus, unions are sometimes mainly seen as collective actors interacting in a macro 
game with politicians and governments, companies and employers’ associations, public 
administration. The problems and dilemmas of unionism are seen as problems of col-
lective interest representation, collective action problems etc. (Crouch 1982, 2003, 
2004, Traxler 1998) and when the issue of the membership relation is raised, the de-
bate becomes embedded in the democracy discourse or in the debate of how to organ-
ize the unorganized. While all of these issues are important, they seem to bypass the 
very basic aspects of unionism mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.2 above 
But before I turn to the consequences of this thinking in present-day Europe, I shall 
have a few words to say about the collective ‘bads’ of trade unionism that have to be 
dealt with in any rejuvenating strategy. 
 
3. ‘La Distinction’: Solidarity as exclusion, some critical remarks 
Worker solidarity and union solidarity are social constructs, and while there are real so-
cial and economic differences at work which can sometimes explain how distinctions 
are drawn, many of the distinction between who may become a member and who may 
not of a particular union would appear to a non-national in a particular European as ar-
bitrary. Especially craft unions and later professional unions and associations have 
turned out rather exclusive in their approach to the membership demarcation issue. 
Sometimes union demarcations may ease co-operative efforts of unions, since when 
they do not compete over the membership, animosity between unions is less intense, 
but union demarcations have the bad fortune of being forced upon the individual em-
ployee (impeding free choice), and also of excluding potential members, sometimes 
even in times of membership decline. 
Joining a union implies giving up some of your autonomy, and handing it to the collec-
tive, i.e. to the union or the local union club. In the past, union activists have been 
adamant that union members should be as uniform a group as possible: thus, part-time 
employees were, in earlier times, not seen as worthy of membership (and thus mem-
bership was not worth it for them), and collective agreements have often laid down 
rules and regulations that everyone has do adhere to, the logic being that the greater 
the differences between the membership, the more difficult would it be for the union to 
act collectively. Sometimes, this is depicted as an historical trend: in the past, workers 
were more alike, while today – in these post-modern times – the average member no 
longer exists. Nevertheless, this is probably a gross exaggeration, since individual dif-
ferences among employees have always been present, maybe even more so a hun-
dred years ago than today. Management styles may have changed and become more 
individualistic (Purcell 1997), and with the growing standards of living, the requirements 
and needs of the membership (and the potential membership) grow and – perhaps es-
pecially – take other forms. The issue of autonomy thus becomes crucial: the more the 
union requires the membership to become activists in a struggle often indirectly aimed 
against other employees, i.e. the less inclusive they are, the less attractive they are to 
parts of the potential membership. Also, as the standard of living increases, employees 
no longer want ‘more of the same’, but start to formulate a whole variation of require-
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ments, many of which cannot become realised simultaneously: some may want higher 
pay, others more flexible working hours, others again longer holidays, and yet others 
higher pensions savings. If the bargaining process requires that a bit of the gains is 
spent in every one of these varying areas, there will only be marginal advances in each 
area will be marginal. 
Seen from the U.S., Europe is a continent of many old-fashioned privileges. Not only 
do Americans often depict the class structure in Europe as more embedded in old no-
bility structures than in the U.S., but also in the labour market, strong legislation or 
practices not only impede dynamism (that is the traditional OECD view, cf. OECD 
2006), but here we come to an area where union practices have been truly exclusion-
ary: the levels of employment protection in many (most) Continental European (e.g. 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) countries create substantial insider-outsider 
problems and very high level of youth unemployment and especially amongst non-
nationals, while other countries (e.g. Denmark) even have legislation than gives special 
protection to salaried employees (and not manual workers). These national variances 
may be considered irrelevant in this context, were it not for the fact that any attempt by 
national governments to deregulate even slightly the rights of certain groups of em-
ployees embedded in the law, often call the unions to the streets in vociferous protests, 
often successful protests. France and Italy are probably the most obvious cases in 
point here. Thus, the exclusivity and insider-outsiderism of strong employment laws is 
certainly upheld by the unions in those countries, who seem to give less of a thought to 
the fate of those not yet fortunate enough to have obtained permanent employment. 
Thus, in many ways, unions may act or may have acted in ways that are sectional and 
not as universal as they would like to pose. What is in the interest of some group may 
run counter to another, and especially if the other group is less well organized (e.g. 
young unemployed people), the well-organized unions’ protests may carry the day.  
This sectionalism may become enhanced in countries where union density is low, be-
cause those unionized may represent an extremist section among the general pattern 
of employees. In countries with high union densities, the majority of moderate members 
tend to restrain the activities of the activists, while in countries with low densities, this 
restraining factor is defused, and union strength is measured by how many they can 
call into the streets. But this depends on many things, and demonstrators can be many 
other people than those in gainful employment. 
 
4. Union Supports and Challenges from Below 
In the macro view, European unions are still in a much more favourable position than 
their U.S. counterparts. In most European countries and in the EU, there is a strong 
understanding that the ‘social partners’ should play some role in policy formulation and 
implementation, and even in countries with Liberal or Conservative governments, these 
governments are often so adamant to uphold social peace and avoid large-scale indus-
trial conflict that they will go quite some way to co-opt the trade unions into their pro-
jects. Thus, the newly elected president in France – while clearly wanting reforms of 
the French labour market – he nevertheless seems to wish to integrate the major 
French unions into his project and he will probably go some way to comply with union 
wishes, as long as they do not thwart the main thrust of his policies. In the same way, 
the new Swedish government did not choose a wholesale, Thatcherite attack on Swed-
ish union, only a number of minor privileges were eradicated, much in the same man-
ner that the Danish Liberal-Conservative government has approached this whole area 
since 2001. 
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On the other hand, there are a number of challenges from below:  
Trade unions in most countries achieved their peak of membership and hence repre-
sentativeness first with the expansion of large ‘Fordist’ manufacturing firms and later on 
of public services and union strength was based among male manual workers in full-
time employment and with more or less permanent contracts.  
Often, trade unions mirrored the centralised, bureaucratic character of their members’ 
employers, in what may be interpreted as the result of mimetic isomorphism (Hyman 
1999, 2004b; Scott 2001); while the construction of solidarity among a workforce with 
limited opportunity for individual career advancement encouraged the pursuit of a stan-
dardised ‘common rule’ in employment (Richards 2001). 
Changes in the demography of both employers and employees have challenged estab-
lished regulatory processes from below. The average size of private firms has shrunk, 
while increasingly, even large private employers seek to develop company-specific re-
gimes of production organisation and conditions of employment (Bacon and Blyton 
2004; Traxler et al. 2001). In this and other respects, the structure of employers which 
supported a nationally standardised system of industrial relations has given place to a 
‘post-Fordist’ pattern of IT and service companies, which, it is often argued, presup-
poses a more diversified and fragmented system, often without any form of collective 
bargaining (Levy and Murnane 2004; Streeck 1987).  
The parallel changes in the labour force are in part a consequence, in part a reflection 
of separate dynamics. Universally, white-collar employees today outnumber manual 
workers. In almost all countries, the former were traditionally far less well unionised 
than the latter, to some extent because the scope for individual career progression in-
hibited collective consciousness but also because many trade unions had reservations 
about recruiting occupational groups which were seen as close to the employer– 
though Denmark and Sweden are important exceptions to this general rule (Kjellberg 
2001; Scheuer 1996; Scheuer and Madsen 2000). The growth in non-manual occupa-
tions is linked to a feminisation of the workforce; and many union movements in the 
past failed, or often made no serious effort, to recruit and represent women – though in 
this context, EU regulation creates new scope for union intervention (Rubery 1992). 
Other increasingly prevalent forms of ‘atypical’ work include part-time employment, 
fixed-term contacts, agency work and dependent self-employment, and the labour force 
has also become more ethnically diverse (Greene et al. 2005). For many analysts, the 
consequence is that solidarity is no longer possible, or at least cannot be sustained as 
traditionally defined by most trade unions (Beck 2002). Perhaps these views are too 
deterministic. Solidarity and unionization are, after all, social constructs, and they may 
become constructed in many ways, if not to the union’s unilateral will. Unions did al-
ways construct solidarity uphill, against the individualizing offers to employees of em-
ployers. But to do it again requires novel approaches. 
In the literature about union renewal (e.g. Frege and Kelly 2003, 2004, Kelly 1998), the 
emphasis is on revitalizing on the macro level, concentrating on the mobilizing and po-
litical roles of trade unions. While this is certainly important, since political influencing 
determines the future conditions that unions must work under, it still seems to overlook 
more basic and mundane aspects of union activity, the union and its relationship to the 
membership. This is the union services or the ‘insurance game’ issue. 
A corollary is that protective and supportive functions traditionally undertaken by trade 
unions with the legitimisation of collective solidarity are now increasingly regarded as 
‘union services’ which may be bought in the market: labour exchange activities, once a 
central union activity, are offered today by a seemingly quite vast array of private com-
panies, technical and educational advice can be bought from consultants, unfair dis-
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missal cases, representation in conflicts and conflict resolution activities can be carried 
out by lawyers, and even policy network activities can be pursued by professional lob-
bying firms. For this reason, even trade unions are beginning to see themselves as 
service providers with a trading arm, selling some of their services. But unions are not 
necessarily best equipped to compete in a market-for-services and may be losing their 
‘primacy’ in the access to certain types of service provision (Crouch 2003). In Denmark, 
aggressive competitors do challenge the unions’ traditional fields in this respect, until 
now with mixed success. 
Redefining trade unions as service providers only is thus a blind alley. Rather, the solu-
tion to the challenges from below is likely to require a more subtle redefinition of the 
boundaries and interaction between collective and individual regulation (Piore 1995; 
Zoll 2000). While ‘free choice’ will strike many union leaders as a ‘market solution’ and 
thus as undesirable, because it sits uncomfortably with unions’ collectivist traditions 
and ideology, free choice embedded in collective bargaining institutional arrangements 
may be seen as not only more attractive, but maybe as the only way out of the present 
quandary.  
 
5. Challenging the Discontents – What Should Unions Do?  
Summarizing, one can say that there are many reasons why it would appear necessary 
for trade unions and more generally for the organizations representing collective inter-
ests in the labour market to rethink their options. Many of the trends challenging unions 
from below have to do with changes at work and in the employment relationship itself, 
while other have to do with more general changes in the outlooks and orientations of 
employees. 
Unions in Europe have been attempting to come to terms with these changes, but often 
in locked-in national perspectives. The structures of unions, of employment legislation, 
of labour market institutions and of the labour market more generally is perceived as so 
nationally unique in each country that this makes the transfer of knowledge relatively 
difficult, something which clearly puts unionism at a disadvantage vis-à-vis employers, 
especially as regard multi-national corporations. 
Therefore, one may point to the following issues for cross-national investigation, issues 
which express trends that appear as common to European trade unions.  
1. The end of the union pay mark-up? Since the companies that union members 
work in are embedded in increasingly competitive environments, and since out-
sourcing and outplacement are increasingly a fact of life, the possibility of the 
union pay mark-up would appear as minimized. The same follows from the de-
centralization, if not direct deregulation of pay formation that has taken place in 
most European countries. This means that unions must change their focus as to 
pay bargaining. Are they doing this, and what does the membership want in this 
connection? Similar discussion might arise concerning working hours, overtime 
etc. 
2. The era of choice? Management styles are no doubt becoming more individual-
ized in many companies, and in the political discourse (both right and left), free 
choice in several areas of life is becoming progressively more important 
(Rosenthal 2006). Union reactions to this have been ambiguous, to say the 
least, since individualism and choice in the employment relationship is often 
perceived as running contrary to collectivism and solidarity. Nevertheless, some 
unions in some countries (Denmark and Sweden have several examples of this) 
have taken up the issue of choice, underscoring that solidarity means giving the 
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individual member the options of choice embedded in the collective agreement 
(recent renewals of collective agreements in manufacturing contain aspects 
where members may choose how parts of the increase is spent: higher pay, 
more days off from work, larger pension contributions etc.). While some unions 
embrace this trend, others are violently opposed. The issue here is this: to what 
extent does the membership (and the potential membership) desire more free 
choice in the collective agreements? Can free choice in the collective agree-
ments become a motivating factor for employees to request collective agree-
ments at their workplace and thus enforcing both collective union representation 
and union density? One may term this ‘embedded flexibility’ or ‘embedded free 
choice’.  
3. Broadening the bargaining agenda? More generally, when some issues are dis-
appearing or becoming weakened in collective agreements (as with pay bar-
gaining or working time regulation), unions must think about how they may 
broaden the bargaining agenda, making collective agreements more attractive 
to employees. The ‘services agenda’ is not – in this connection – perceived of 
as an improvement in the unions’ own services (while that might certainly also 
be needed), but more in terms of how unions via the collective agreements may 
enable a broader bargaining agenda and more employee formal rights vis-à-vis 
the employer. While this might appear as unrealistic in view of union member-
ship losses, unions still have a power base and collective bargaining coverage 
certainly has not been declining to the same extent as union density (Traxler 
1994, 1998). Thus, unions need to think of how to enter novel aspects of the 
employment relationship into these agreements, such as: 
a. The right to an annual personnel career interview (or an annual individ-
ual pay review). 
b. The right to an annual one or two week’s vocational training or course 
participation. 
c. Funds to pay for this training or courses. 
d. The right to collective labour market pensions (supplementary to general 
societal pensions provisions) with employer and employee contributions 
(cf. Due & Madsen 2003, and also 2006) 
e. The right to take leave on your child’s first day of illness. 
f. The right to move from full time to part time and vice versa. 
g. The right to extra days of holiday (that can be traded to so many days’ 
extra pay). 
4. Weakening old rigidities in collective agreements. If working time regulations 
etc. are weakened anyway and if unions wish to broaden their agendas, they 
might as well trade in some of the left-overs from old unionism: if unions are 
weakened already, why not trade in what you are going to loose anyway, in or-
der to cover novel aspects that would attract employees in the private service 
sector and in the ‘new economy’ where unions in many countries are too con-
spicuously absent. 
Needless to say, the issues mentioned also have the aim of presenting solutions to the 
perennial collective actor problem. Rights of choice and rights to training funds or extra 
holidays (point 2 and 3) may spill over into non-unionized companies and sectors, but 
exactly since they are individual rights, this ‘risk’ is not high, and there are going to be 
substantial sectors of the economy where they do not exist or only exist in shadow 
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forms. Therefore, these kinds of strategies solve more problems at once. The ques-
tions is, finally, if unions are willing to ponder this kind of strategy, and, especially, 
whether they can find mechanisms that enable them to investigate members’ prefer-
ences concerning areas of rights and free choice that are important today. 
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